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Abstract
We analyze the eﬀect of counterparty risk on insurance contracts using the case of credit risk
transfer in banking. In addition to the familiar moral hazard problem caused by the insuree’s
ability to inﬂuence the probability of a claim, this paper uncovers a new moral hazard problem on
the other side of the market. We show that the insurer’s investment strategy may not be in the
best interests of the insuree. The reason for this is that if the insurer believes it is unlikely that a
claim will be made, it is advantageous for them to invest in assets which earn higher returns, but
may not be readily available if needed. This paper models both of these moral hazard problems
in a uniﬁed framework. We ﬁnd that instability in the insurer can create an incentive for the
insuree to reveal superior information about the risk of their “investment”. In particular, a unique
separating equilibrium may exist even in the absence of any signalling device. We extend the model
and show that increasing the number of insurers with which the insuree contracts can exacerbate
the moral hazard problem and may not decrease counterparty risk. Our research suggests that
regulators should be wary of risk being oﬄoaded to other, possibly unstable parties, especially in
newer ﬁnancial markets such as that of credit derivatives.
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In this paper, we develop an agency model to analyze an insurer’s optimal investment decision
when failure is a possibility. We demonstrate that an insurer’s investment choice may be suboptimal
compared to the ﬁrst best by showing how a moral hazard problem exists on this side of the market.
This insurer moral hazard problem does have an upside however, as we show that it can alleviate
the adverse selection problem on the part of the insuree.
The market for risk protection is one of the most important markets available today. Although
we model a general insurance problem, a particularly relevant example in today’s ﬁnancial markets
is that of credit risk transfer.1 Banks, who were once conﬁned to a simple borrow short and lend
long strategy, can now disperse credit risk through credit derivatives markets to better implement
risk management policies.2 The rapid growth in these ﬁnancial markets requires us to think of
insurance in a diﬀerent way than is standard in the literature. The reason is that banks are ceding
potentially large credit risks to parties such as Hedge Funds which may or may not be in a better
position to handle them.3 Furthermore, Allen and Gale (2006) wonder whether credit risk transfer
is done simply as a form of regulatory arbitrage. It would seem prudent then to ask the question
of how stable is, and what are the incentives of the risk taker (insurer)? This entails a study of
counterparty risk. In what is to follow, we deﬁne counterparty risk as the risk that when a claim
is made, the insurer is insolvent and not able to fulﬁl its obligations.
This paper arrives at two novel results. The ﬁrst is that there can exist a moral hazard on the
part of the insurer. This moral hazard arises because the insurer may choose an excessively risky
portfolio. The intuition behind this result is as follows. There are two key states of the world that
enter into the insurer’s decision problem: the ﬁrst in which a claim is not made, and the second in
which it is. We assume that the insurer can default in both of these states if they get an unlucky
draw. However, they can invest to help minimize the chances that they become insolvent. This
investment choice comes with a tradeoﬀ: what reduces the probability of insolvency the most in the
state in which a claim is not made, makes it more likely that the insurer will become insolvent in the
state in which it is. If we consider a situation in which the insurers beliefs are such that the contract
is relatively safe, it may be optimal to put capital into less liquid assets to reap higher returns, and
lower the chance of failure in the state in which a claim is not made. However, assets which yield
these higher returns can also be more costly to liquidate, and therefore, make it more diﬃcult to
free up capital if a claim is made. The moral hazard arises because the insurance premium must be
1Another example of a ﬁnancial insurance market is the market for reinsurance.
2A credit derivative, and speciﬁcally a credit default swap is a contract whereby an insurer agrees to cover the
losses of an insuree that take place if pre-deﬁned events happen to an underlying borrower (In many cases, this
event is the default of the underlying bond. However, some contracts include things like re-structuring and ratings
downgrades as triggering events). In exchange for this protection, the insuree agrees to pay an ongoing premium at
ﬁxed intervals for the life of the contract.
3Fitch (2006) reports that banks are the largest insuree in this market. On the insurer side, banks and hedge
funds are the largest, followed by insurance companies and other ﬁnancial guarantors. It should be noted that the
author’s suspect that banks are the largest insurers, followed by hedge funds, however, they admit that the data is
poor and that other research reports do not support this.
1made up front, which introduces a contracting imperfection. This imperfection means the insuree
cannot condition its premium on an observed outcome. Consequently, there is no way to provide
incentives to the insurer to inﬂuence its investment decision.
The second result deals with the adverse selection problem that may be present because of the
superior information that the insuree has about the underlying claim. Akerloﬀ (1970) represents
a fundamental paper on the dangers of informational asymmetries in insurance markets. In this
seminal paper, it is shown how the market for good risks may break down, and one is left with
insurance only being issued on the most risky of assets, or in Akerloﬀ’s terminology, lemons. The
incentive that underlies this result is that the insuree is only interested in obtaining the lowest
insurance premium possible.
In contrast, in this paper we show that the safer the underlying claim is perceived to be,
the more severe the moral hazard problem is. Consequently, conditional on a claim being made,
counterparty risk is higher for safer assets. Therefore, it can optimal for an insuree with a poor
quality asset to reveal its type truthfully. In other words, if it is revealed as poor quality, the
insurer will have incentives more in line with the insuree, and consequently it is subjected to less
counterparty risk. We show that this new eﬀect, which we call the counterparty risk eﬀect allows a
unique separating equilibrium to be possible. This result is new in that separation occurs without
the existence of a signalling device. After Akerloﬀ (1970) showed that no separating equilibrium
can exist, the literature developed the concept of signalling devices with such famous examples
as education in Spence’s job market signalling paper. These papers allowed the high (safe) type
agents to separate themselves by performing a task which is “cheaper” for them than for the low
(risky) type agents. Our paper can achieve separation by the balance between the insuree’s desire
for the lowest insurance premium, and the desire to be exposed to the least counterparty risk. One
can think of this result as adding to the cheap talk literature by showing an insurance problem in
which costless communication can bring about separation of types.4
We enrich the model to the case of multiple insurers. The result is that as the size of the contract
that each insurer takes on decreases, the moral hazard problem will increase. In a setup in which all
the insurers are ex-ante identical (but not necessarily ex-post, i.e. they receive IID portfolio draws),
we obtain the result that counterparty risk may remain unchanged. Next, we consider the case of
multiple insurees. We show that even when each individual insuree is insigniﬁcant to the insurer
(resembling that of a traditional insurance market such as health or automobile), our results carry
through when there is aggregate risk that is private information to the insurees. Furthermore, our
moral hazard result still remains if this assumption on risk is not met.
Finally, we enrich the model to include a possible moral hazard problem on the part of the
insuree by their ability to aﬀect the probability that a claim is made. If we use the example of a
bank being insured on one of their loans, the banking literature typically assumes that a bank has
superior information about that loan (due to their relationship with the borrower). On account of
this, it is straightforward to see that if the bank is fully insured, they may not have the incentive
4For a nice review of the cheap talk literature, see Farrell and Rabin (1996).
2to monitor the loan, and consequently, the probability of default could rise. This represents the
classical moral hazard problem in the insurance literature. Our extension to the model shows
that the new moral hazard of this paper may increase the desire of the insuree to monitor. This
happens because counterparty risk forces the bank to internalize some of the default risk, which
they otherwise would not if there is no counterparty risk. In this section we show that with a
redeﬁnition of the insuree’s payoﬀ distribution function, the addition of this insuree moral hazard
problem does not eﬀect the results of the paper.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper contributes to two streams of literature: that of insurance economics and that of
credit risk transfer and credit derivatives. We contribute to the literature on insurance economics
by raising the issue of counterparty risk which has not received much attention. The reason for
this is that the traditional insurance economics literature imagines the insurer as large, and the
insuree, small. This may be acceptable for some traditional markets, but modern ﬁnancial markets
require a new framework to asses insurance contracts. Henriet and Michel-Kerjan (2006) recognize
that insurance contracts need not ﬁt the traditional setup in which the insurer is the principal and
the insuree, the agent. The authors relax this assumption and allow the roles to change. Their
paper however does not consider the possibility of counterparty risk as ours does, as they assume
that neither party can fail. Plantin and Rochet (2007) raise the issue of prudential regulation of
insurance companies. They give practical recommendations for countries to better design their
regulation of insurance companies. This work does not consider the insurance contract itself under
counterparty risk as is done in this paper. Consequently, the author’s do not analyze the eﬀects of
counterparty risk on the informational problems of insurance. Instead, they conjecture an agency
problem arising from a corporate governance standpoint. We analyze a more abstract agency
problem driven entirely by the investment incentives of the insurer.
The literature on credit risk transfer (CRT) is relatively small but is growing. Allen and Gale
(2006) motivate a role for CRT in the banking environment. Using the same framework, Allen and
Carletti (2006) show how a default by an insurance company can cascade into the banking sector
causing a contagion eﬀect when these two parties are linked through the transfer of credit risk.
Wagner and Marsh (2006) argue that setting regulatory standards that reﬂect the diﬀerent social
costs of instability in the bank and insurance sector will be welfare improving. Our paper diﬀers
from these because they do not consider the agency problems of insurance contracts. As a result,
they do not discuss the consequences that instability can have on the contracting environment, and
how this aﬀects the behavior of the parties involved. Duﬀee and Zhou (2001) and Thompson (2007)
both analyze informational problems in insurance contracts, however, they focus on the factors that
aﬀect the choice between sales and insurance of credit risk. In contrast, we do not focus on the
choice of an optimal risk transfer technique, but rather, we look deeper into one of them: insurance.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 outlines the model and solves the insurer’s problem.
Section 3 determines the equilibria that can be sustained when adverse selection is present. Fur-
3thermore, this section determines the ﬁrst best investment choice and proves the existence of a
moral hazard problem on the part of the insurer. Section 4 analyzes the following extensions: 1)
multiple insurers, 2) multiple insurees, and 3) classical moral hazard on the side of the insuree. In
section 5 we conclude. Many of the longer proofs are relegated to the appendix in section 6.
2 The Model Setup
The model is in three dates indexed t = 0,1,2. There are three agents, an insuree, whom
we will call a bank, and multiple risk insurers, whom we will call Insuring Financial Institutions
(IFIs). As well, there is an underlying borrower who has a loan with the bank. We will model this
party simply as a return structure. The size of the loan will be normalized to 1 for simplicity. We
motivate the need for insurance through an exogenous parameter (to be explained below) which
makes the bank display risk aversion.5 We assume there is no discounting, however, adding this
feature will not eﬀect our results.
2.1 The Bank
The bank is characterized by the need to shed credit (loan) risk. We use the example of a bank
that faces capital regulation and who must reduce their risk, or else could face a cost (which we will
call Z). It is this cost that makes the bank averse to holding the risk and so ﬁnds it advantageous
to shed it through insurance. We can think of this situation as arising from an endogenous reaction
to a shock to the banks portfolio, however for simplicity, we will not model this here. There are two
types of loans that a bank can insure, a safe type (S) and a risky type (R). A bank is endowed with
one or the other (for simplicity we assume with equal probability, however, it is not required for
our results). The loan type is private knowledge for the bank and reﬂects the unique relationship
between them and the underlying borrower. We assume that the loan can be costlessly monitored,
so that there is no moral hazard problem in the bank-borrower relationship. In section 4.3 we will
relax this assumption and show that introducing costly monitoring does not change the results of









Where ψ is the total return from the loan and hS and hR are return density functions, with
corresponding distributions: HS and HR. We deﬁne the upper bound of these two functions as S
and R respectively. Note that there is nothing in the analysis to follow that requires this to be a
5A smooth concave utility function will only distract from our analysis and will not yield new insights. As will
soon become apparent, the issue of how much risk to shed will not play a role in the analysis. Instead, we show that
we can obtain a separating equilibrium without the amount of insurance being used a signal.
4single loan. When we interpret this as a single loan, the insurance contracts to be introduced in
section 2.3 will resemble that of a credit default swap. In the case that this is a return on many
loans, the insurance contract will closely resemble that of a portfolio default swap or basket default
swap.6
Both loan types are assumed to default if the realized value is ˜ ψ ∈ [0,1]. To distinguish the safe
from the risky loan, we assume that HS(1) < HR(1) so that the probability of default of the safe
loan is less than that of the risky loan.7 We use a continuous set of states as opposed to a discrete
set because it is useful for section 4.3 where we exploit this enriched view of the bank loan.
The regulator requires the bank to transfer a set amount of default risk. For simplicity, the bank
must transfer a proportion γ of their loan, regardless of its type.8 We impose the exogenous cost
Z on the bank if the loan defaults and they are not insured for the appropriate amount, or if they
are insured for the appropriate amount, but their counterparty is not able to fulﬁl the insurance
contract (we will discuss the reasons this may occur below).
In what is to follow, we only model the payoﬀ to this loan for the bank, however, it can be
viewed as only a portion of its total portfolio. For simplicity, we assume that the bank cannot fail
in the model. Having the bank able to fail will not aﬀect our qualitative results since it will not
aﬀect the insurance contract to be introduced in section 2.3. We now turn to the modelling of the
IFI.
2.2 The Insuring Financial Institution
Without the sale of the insurance contract, we assume that the IFI has a payoﬀ function of the








(G − θ)f(θ)dθ, (3)
where f(θ) is a probability density function with corresponding distribution F(θ) representing the
random return or valuation of the IFI’s portfolio, and G is the cost of bankruptcy. One inter-
6A portfolio or basket default swap is a contract written on more than one loan. There are many diﬀerent
conﬁgurations of these types of contracts. For example, a ﬁrst-to-default contract says that a claim can be made as
soon as the ﬁrst loan in the basket defaults.
7We need not assume anything about the shape of either distribution function. For example, it could be the case
that E(R) > E(S) and var(R) > var(S), but it is not required.
8The fact that the bank must insure the same amount, regardless of the type of loan is not crucial. We can think
of γ being solved for by the bank’s own internal risk management. Therefore, we could have a diﬀering γ depending
on loan quality. What is important in this case is that the IFI is not able to perfectly infer the probability of default
from γ. This assumption is justiﬁed when the counterparty does not know the exact reason the bank is insuring. To
know so would require them to go in depth into the bank’s book, which should be excluded as a possibility. In this
enriched case, we could make γ stochastic for each loan type reﬂecting diﬀerent (private) ﬁnancial situations for the
bank. In this case, the IFI may not be able to infer the loan quality from the amount that the bank wishes to have
insured. This topic has been addressed in the new Basel II accord which allows the bank to use their own internal
risk management system in some cases to calculate needed capital holdings. One reason for this change is because of
the superior information banks are thought to have on their own assets; regulators have acknowledged that the bank
itself may be in the best position to evaluate its own risk.
5pretation of G is lost goodwill, but any reason for which the IFI would not like to go bankrupt
will suﬃce. Note that bankruptcy occurs when the portfolio draw is in the set [Rf,0], where it is
assumed Rf < 0. In what is to follow, we simplify the analysis by deﬁning our portfolio distribution
as uniform.9 It is assumed that the IFI receives this payoﬀ at time t = 2, so that at time t = 1,
the random variable θ represents the portfolio value if it could be costlessly liquidated at that
time. However, the IFI’s portfolio is assumed to be composed of both liquid and illiquid assets. In
practice, we observe ﬁnancial institutions holding both liquid (e.g t-bills, money market deposits)
and illiquid (e.g loans, some exotic options, some newer structured ﬁnance products) investments
on its books. Because of this, if the IFI wishes to liquidate some of their portfolio at time t = 1,
they will be subject to a liquidity cost which we discuss below in section 2.3.
2.3 The Insurance Contract
We now introduce the means by which the bank is insured by the IFI. Because of the possible
cost Z, at time t = 0 the bank requests an insurance contract in the amount of γ for one period
of protection. Therefore, the insurance coverage is from t = 0 to t = 1. To begin, we assume that
the bank contracts with one IFI who is in bertrand competition. This assumption will be relaxed
in section 4.1 when we allow the bank to spread the contract among multiple IFIs. The IFI forms
a belief b about the probability that the bank loan will default. In section 3 we will show how b
is formed endogenously as an equilibrium condition of the model. In exchange for this protection,
the IFI receives an insurance premium Pγ, where P is the per unit price of coverage. The IFI
chooses a proportion β of this premium to put in a liquid asset that, for simplicity, has a rate of
return normalized to one in both t = 1 and t = 2, but can be accessed at either time period. The
remaining proportion 1 − β is put in an illiquid asset with an exogenously given rate of return of
RI which pays out at time t = 2.10 This asset can be thought of as a two period project that
cannot be terminated early. It is this property that makes it illiquid. As we shall soon see, the
payoﬀ to the IFI is linear in the state in which a claim is not made and therefore a redeﬁnition of
the return would allow us to capture uncertainty in the illiquid asset to make it risky as well as
illiquid. Therefore there is no loss of generality assuming this return is certain. We assume RI is
paid at t = 2 when the portfolio pays oﬀ.11 The key diﬀerence between these two assets is that the
liquid asset is accessible at t = 1 when the underlying loan may default, whereas the illiquid asset
is only available at t = 2.12
9This assumption can be relaxed to a general distribution, provided that it satisﬁes some conditions. For example,
there must be mass in a region above and below zero. We explore this extension in a previous version of the paper
and is available from the author upon request.
10We can think of these as two assets that are in the IFI’s portfolio, however, we assume that this amount is
small so that the illiquid asset and the original portfolio are uncorrelated. Note that adding correlation would only
complicate the analysis and would not change the qualitative results.
11The choice between the liquid and illiquid assets is not crucial. The choice can be between a risky and riskless
asset (both liquid) and the qualitative results of the paper will still hold. We explore this in a previous version of the
paper that is available from the author upon request.
12This can be relaxed to allow the recovery of the illiquid asset at ﬁre sale prices, but the qualitative results of the
model would remain the same.
6For the remaining capital needed (net of the premium put in the liquid asset) if a claim is
made, we assume that the IFI can liquidate its portfolio. Recall that the IFI’s initial portfolio
contains both liquid and illiquid assets of possibly varying degrees with return governed by F.
We assume that the IFI has a liquidation cost represented by the invertible function C(·) with
C0() > 0, C00() ≥ 0, and C(0) = 0. The weak convexity of C(·) represents the various assets of
diﬀering liquidity in the IFI’s portfolio.13 The IFI will choose to liquidate the least costly assets
ﬁrst, but as more capital is required, the cost of liquidating increases as they are forced to liquidate
illiquid assets at potentially ﬁre sale prices.14 C(·) takes as its argument the amount of capital
needed from the portfolio, and returns a number that represents the actual amount that must be
liquidated to achieve that amount of capital. This implies that C(x) ≥ x ∀x ≥ 0 so that C0(x) ≥ 1.
For example, if there is no cost of liquidation and if $x is required to be accessed from the portfolio,
the IFI can liquidate $x to satisfy its capital needs. However, because liquidation may be costly in
this model, the IFI must now liquidate $y ≥ $x so that by the time the liquidation function C(·)
shrinks the value of the capital, the IFI is left with $x. If C(·) is linear, our problem becomes a
linear program, and as will soon become apparent, this yields an extreme case of moral hazard.
At time t = 1, the IFI learns what the return on its portfolio will be (or leans a valuation of
its portfolio), however, the return is not realized until t = 2. This could be relaxed so that the
IFI receives a fuzzy signal about the return, however, this would yield no further insight into the
problem. Also at t = 1, a claim is made if the underlying borrower defaults. If a claim is made, the
IFI can liquidate its portfolio to fulﬁl its obligation of γ.15 If the contract cannot be fulﬁlled, the
IFI defaults. At time t = 2, conditional on the IFI’s survival at time t = 1, the payoﬀ to the IFI
from its portfolio is realized. Also at time t = 2, the payoﬀ to the bank’s loan is realized. Figure 1
summarizes the timing of the model.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2




If needed, IFI pays contract or
goes bankrupt
Bank endowed with (S)afe
or (R)isky loan
IFI receives signal of its
portfolio payoﬀ
and
State of insurance contract
realized
Bank insures proportion γ of loan
for premium Pγ
IFI choses liquid (β) and illiquid
(1 − β) investment
Figure 1: Timing of the model
13If we think of a bank as the IFI, it is obvious that they have many illiquid assets on their books. However, This
is also the very nature most insurance companies and hedge funds businesses. In the case of insurance companies as
the IFI, substantial portions of their portfolios may be in assets which cannot be liquidated easily (see Plantin and
Rochet (2007)). In the case of Hedge Funds as the IFI, many of them specialize in trading in illiquid markets (see
Brunnermeier and Pederson (2005) for example).
14There is a growing literature on trading in illiquid markets and ﬁre sales. See for example Subramanian and
Jarrow (2001), and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005).
15Note that this contract structure is assumed for simplicity. In reality, the insuring institution would typically
pay the full protection value, but would receive the bond of the underlying borrower in return, which may still have
a recovery value. Inserting this recovery value into the model only complicates the mathematics without changing
the qualitative results.
7The payoﬀ function for the IFI can be written as (we suppress the superscript I denoting insurance
as the remainder of the paper will analyze with this setting):
















+Pγ(β + (1 − β)RI) (4)
The ﬁrst term is the expected payoﬀ when a claim is not made, which happens with probability
1−b given by to the IFI’s beliefs.16 The −Pγ(β +(1−β)RI) term in the integrand represents the
positive diversiﬁcation beneﬁt that engaging in these contracts can have: it reduces the probability
of portfolio default when a claim is not made. We assume that Rf is suﬃciently negative so that
Pγ (β + (1 − β)RI) < |Rf|. Since P and β are both bounded from above (by 1)17, it follows
that this inequality is satisﬁed for a ﬁnite Rf. This assumption ensures that the IFI cannot
completely eliminate its probability of default in this state. Recall that before the IFI engaged in
the insurance contract, they would be forced into insolvency when their portfolio draw was less
than zero. However, we see that in the state in which a claim is not made, they can receive a
portfolio draw that is less than zero and still remain solvent (so long as their draw is greater than
−Pγ(β + (1 − β)RI)) . Since the IFI is able to lower its chances of defaulting in this state by
investing some of the proceeds of the contract, we refer to this as the IFI diversifying its portfolio.
The second term is the expected payoﬀ when a claim is made, which happens with probability
B given by the IFI’s beliefs. The term C(γ − βPγ) represents the cost to the IFI of accessing
the needed capital to pay a claim. Notice that the loans placed in the illiquid asset are not
available if a claim is made. Furthermore, the probability of default for the IFI increases in this
case. To see this, notice that before engaging int eh insurance contract, the IFI would default is
its portfolio draw ˜ θ ∈ [Rf,0]. After the insurance contract, we see that they default if the draw
˜ θ ∈ [Rf,C(γ − βPγ) > 0]. To ensure that the IFI prefers to pay the insurance contract when they
are solvent, we assume that G ≥ C(γ −βPγ)+βPγ. Intuitively, if this condition does not to hold,
the IFI would rather declare bankruptcy than fulﬁl the insurance contract, no matter what their
portfolio draw is. The ﬁnal term in (4) (Pγ(β +(1−β)RI)) is the payoﬀ of the insurance premium
given how it was invested.
As stated previously, we deﬁne counterparty risk as the probability that the IFI defaults, con-
ditional on a claim being made. Therefore, it is now clear that in the context of the model,
counterparty risk is given by
R C(γ−βPγ)
Rf f(θ)dθ.
16Note that this does not necessarily have to be the true probability of default, as we shall discover in section 3.
17This is true for β by construction and will be proven for P in Lemma 1.
82.4 IFI Behavior
We now characterize the optimal investment choice of the IFI and the resulting market clearing
price. We begin by looking at the IFI’s optimal investment decision. In section 3.1 we will show that
the optimal choice of β∗ for the IFI is less than the ﬁrst best choice, βfb. In other words, the IFI
acts riskier than they would if there were no contracting imperfections. The following proposition
characterizes the optimal behavior conditional on an equilibrium belief (b) and an equilibrium price
(P). The IFI is shown to invest more in the liquid asset if it believes a claim is more likely to be
made.
Proposition 1 The optimal investment in the liquid asset (β∗) is increasing in b.
Proof. See appendix.
From the implicit solution for β∗ derived in the proof to Proposition 1, we see that the result
is conditional on a price P. We deﬁne P∗ as the equilibrium market clearing price. To ﬁnd it, we
require the IFI to earn zero proﬁt from engaging in the insurance contract.18 We do not implement
the zero proﬁt condition on total proﬁt. The reason for this is that if we take zero total proﬁt, the
additional proﬁt earned from engaging in the insurance contract may be negative. Therefore, the
payoﬀ from the initial portfolio must be excluded. We re-write (4) in terms of the payoﬀ to the IFI
from only the insurance contract. We obtain this equation by subtracting (3) from (4). Call this
payoﬀ VIFI.















+ Pγ(β + (1 − β)RI). (5)
It is straightforward to verify that the optimal β∗ as derived in Proposition 1 from the total
proﬁt is the same as would be derived from optimizing VIFI. Furthermore, the following lemma
yields both existence and uniqueness of the market clearing price P∗.
Lemma 1 There exists a unique market clearing price in the open set (0,1).
Proof. See appendix.
We now analyze the properties of the equilibrium price P∗. The following lemma shows that
as the IFI’s beliefs about the probability a claim increases, so too must the premium increase to
compensate them for the additional risk.
18Lemma 3 shows that this assumption can be relaxed to allow more market power to the IFI without aﬀecting
our results.
9Lemma 2 The market clearing price P∗ is increasing in the belief of the probability of a claim (b).
Proof. See appendix.
The lemma yields the intuitive result that our pricing function P(b) is increasing in b. The
price itself is not the focus of this paper; it can be solved for from the IFI’s zero proﬁt condition,
VIFI = 0 where VIFI is given by (5).
We now turn to the issue of bargaining power. In the preceding analysis, we assumed that there
was bertrand competition amongst the IFIs. We then invoked a zero proﬁt condition to pin down
the equilibrium price P∗. This turns out not to be a crucial assumption. The following lemma
shows that if we allow the IFI to make positive proﬁt, this will have no eﬀect on counterparty risk,
unless the underlying loan is “very” risky.
Lemma 3 If the IFI can make positive proﬁt so that P∗ increases, counterparty risk remains
unchanged unless β∗ = 1, where it decreases.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition behind this result is that if we increase the amount of money given to the IFI
without changing their beliefs, this will have no eﬀect on the marginal beneﬁt of choosing the liquid
asset. The IFI makes its optimal choice by putting money into the liquid asset until the marginal
beneﬁt of doing so falls to the level of that of putting it into the illiquid asset. Since increasing
just the premium will not change their beliefs (b), this will not change the absolute amount of the
premium they put in the liquid asset. Instead, they will put all additional capital into the illiquid
asset (which will have a higher marginal return at that point). The lemma shows that the only
time counterparty risk will decrease is when β∗ = 1, or in other words, when the loan is ‘very’ risky
(recall that Proposition 1 showed that β∗ is increasing in b). This case can only be obtained when
both before and after the price increase, the underlying loan is so risky that it is never optimal to
put any capital in the illiquid asset, so that all additional capital goes into the liquid asset.
3 Equilibrium Beliefs
Akerlof (1970) showed how insurance contracts can be plagued by the ‘lemons’ problem. One
underlying incentive in his model that generates this result is that the insuree wishes only to
minimize the premium they pay. It is for this reason that high risk agents would wish to conceal
their type. In this environment, only pooling equilibria can be supported. Subsequent literature
to the Akerlof (1970) result showed how the presence of a signalling device can allow a separating
equilibrium to exist. What is new in our paper is that no signalling device is needed to justify the
existence of a separating equilibrium. We will call the act of concealing one’s type for the beneﬁt of
a lower insurance premium the premium eﬀect. For the situation that we have been analyzing, we
show in this section that this eﬀect may be subdued in the presence of counterparty risk. We show
10that there is another eﬀect that works against the premium eﬀect that we will call the counterparty
risk eﬀect. The intuition of this new eﬀect is that if high risk agents attempt to be revealed as
low risk, they may obtain a better insurance premium, but the following lemma shows that their
counterparty risk will increase.
Lemma 4 If b decreases, but the actual probability of a claim does not, counterparty risk rises
whenever β ∈ (0,1].
Proof. See appendix.
There are two factors that contribute to this result. First, Lemma 2 showed that as the per-
ceived probability of default decreases, the premium also decreases and therefore leaves less capital
available to be invested in either asset. Second, since the IFI believes that the loan has a lower
probability of failing, it puts more weight on the state in which a claim is not made. Consequently,
it is optimal for the IFI to decrease β so as to capitalize on the increased return from the illiquid
asset. When we combine these two facts, the counterparty risk unambiguously increases. The only
case when the counterparty risk will not rise is when the bank is already investing everything in
the illiquid asset, and the decrease in perceived probability of default does not change this.
To analyze the resulting equilibria, we employ the equilibrium concept of a perfect Baysian
Nash Equilibrium (PBE). We now deﬁne an equilibrium in our model.
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium is deﬁned as a β, a price P, and a belief b such that:
1. b is consistent with Bayes’ rule where possible.
2. The bank optimally chooses to reveal or not reveal truthfully its type.
3. Choosing P, The IFI earns zero proﬁt with β derived according to the IFI’s problem.
We look ﬁrst at the equilibrium that is unique to the insurance market under counterparty risk.
We ask: is there a separating equilibrium in which the safe loans are revealed as such? The answer
without counterparty risk is no. The reason is that in this setting, there is no signalling device
present, making it costless for the bank with a risky loan to imitate a bank with a safe loan.
However, with counterparty risk, it is possible that both types credibly reveal themselves so that
separation occurs. Deﬁne the type space i ∈ {S,R} to represent the two possible bank types, and
deﬁne the message space M ∈ {S,R} to represent the report that bank type i sends to the IFI.
Let the payoﬀ be Π(i,M) which represents the proﬁt that a type i bank receives from sending the
message M. To begin, assume that the IFI’s beliefs are such that we are in a separating equilibrium.




0 dHR). Denote the resulting price of the safe
(risky) contract as PS (PR). Finally, let the investment in the liquid asset for the bank with safe
(risky) loan be derived according to Proposition 1 and be denoted by βS (βR). We now write the



















(Z − ψ)dF(θ)dHS(ψ) − γPS (6)
The ﬁrst term represents the expected payoﬀ to the bank conditional on the loan not defaulting.
The second term represents the expected payoﬀ (conditional on loan default) to the bank of the
uninsured portion of the loan. The third term represents the expected payoﬀ (conditional on loan
default) in the case in which the IFI remains solvent and is able to pay γ to the bank as per the
insurance contract. The fourth term represents the expected payoﬀ (conditional on loan default)
in the case in which the IFI is insolvent and cannot fulﬁl the terms of the insurance contract. The
ﬁnal term is the insurance premium that the bank must pay to the IFI for protection. We now


















(Z − ψ)dF(θ)dHR(ψ) − γPR (7)
We check the conditions under which neither bank type would like to deviate and report the wrong
type. In this case, the IFI chooses (wrongly) βR (βS) when the bank type is safe (risky). Therefore,
we are checking the conditions that could sustain a separating equilibrium.









expected cost of the additional counterparty risk
≤ PR − PS | {z }
amount to be saved in insurance premia
(8)
From Lemma 4 we know that C(γ − βRPRγ) < C(γ − βSPSγ) so that the left hand side repre-
sents the amount of counterparty risk the bank will save if it conceals its type. This is what we call
the counterparty risk eﬀect. The right hand side represents the amount of insurance premium that
the bank will save if it is able to credibly reveal itself as being a safe loan. This is the premium
eﬀect. We now turn to a bank with a risky loan and repeat the same exercise.









expected saving in counterparty risk
≥ PR − PS | {z }
amount extra to be paid in insurance premia
(9)
Again, from Lemma 4 we know that C(γ−βRPRγ) < C(γ−βSPSγ) and therefore the left hand
side represents the additional counterparty risk that a bank with a risky loan will have to take on
if they do not reveal their type. The right hand side represents the savings in insurance premium
that the bank would receive if they did not reveal their type truthfully.
Therefore, when (8) and (9) simultaneously hold, this equilibrium exists. To give an example
of when this can hold, we look at the case in which the safe loan is “very” safe. In particular, we
let lim
R 1
0 dHG(θ) → 0 and we obtain:
0 |{z}
expected cost of the additional counterparty risk
≤ PR − PS | {z }










expected saving in counterparty risk
≥ PR − PS | {z }
amount extra to be paid in insurance premia
(11)
Note here that PS = 0 since the probability of default is tending to zero. Inequality (10) is
satisﬁed trivially, while (11) is satisﬁed when Z is suﬃciently large. Recall that Z is the cost of
counterparty failure when a claim is made. Therefore this outcome can be achieved by having a high
enough penalty on the bank for taking on counterparty risk. This is intuitive since a larger penalty
makes them internalize the counterparty risk more, and as a result, greater transparency is achieved
in the market. This is a sense in which counterparty risk may be beneﬁcial to the market, since it
can help alleviate the adverse selection problem caused by one party having superior information.
In this case, the IFI’s beliefs are fully deﬁned by Bayes’ rule. We can now state the ﬁrst main result
of the paper.
Proposition 2 In the absence of counterparty risk, no separating equilibrium can exist. When
there is counterparty risk, the moral hazard problem allows a unique separating equilibrium to exist
in which each type of bank truthfully announces its loan risk. A suﬃcient condition for this is either
that the safe loan is relatively safe, the bankruptcy cost Z is large, or both.
Proof. See appendix.
This proposition shows that a moral hazard problem on the part of the insurer can alleviate
the adverse selection problem on the part of the insuree. The separating equilibrium is the case in
which the premium eﬀect dominates for the bank with the safe loan, while the counterparty risk
13eﬀect dominates for the bank with the risky loan. Note that the case in which the safe type wishes
to be revealed as risky, and the risky type wishes to be revealed as safe is ruled out in the proof to
Proposition 2.
There are also two other pooling equilibria that may exist. The ﬁrst pooling equilibrium occurs
when both the safe and risky bank report that they are safe. In this case, the premium eﬀect
dominates for both types. Therefore, no information is gleaned by the IFI by the message sent
from the banks. Any oﬀ-the-equilibrium path belief with b > 1
2
R 1
0 dHS + 1
2
R 1
0 dHR if risky is
reported is consistent for the IFI with the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion.
The second pooling equilibrium occurs when both the safe and risky bank report that they are
risky. In this case, the counterparty risk eﬀect dominates for both types. Any oﬀ-the-equilibrium
path belief with b < 1
2
R 1
0 dHS + 1
2
R 1
0 dHR if safe is reported is consistent with the Cho-Kreps
intuitive criterion. We formalize both of these pooling equilibrium in the proof to Proposition 2.
We now compare the above analysis with the ﬁrst best outcome to highlight the ineﬃciencies
and to formally prove the existence of a moral hazard problem.
3.1 The First Best Contract
To ﬁnd the ﬁrst best contract between the bank and the IFI, we look at the case in which there
are no contracting imperfections. In particular, we do away with the ability of the IFI to invest
the premium however it wishes, while maintaining the zero proﬁt assumption. It is appropriate to
look at a ﬁrst best choice of β for both a separating and pooling equilibrium. In this way, we can
focus on the eﬀects of contracting imperfections and isolate them from the well understood eﬀects
of the standard adverse selection problem. Therefore, the ﬁrst best can be found by maximizing
the bank’s proﬁt, subject to the IFI’s zero proﬁt condition. We denote the ﬁrst best solution for β
in the separating case as β
fb
sp, and the ﬁrst best price in the separating case as P
fb
sp . As well, let the
equilibrium β and the resulting price from Proposition 1 be denoted by β∗
sp and P∗
sp respectively.
The following Lemma shows that the equilibrium price P∗




Lemma 5 There is no price ˜ P < P∗





Proof. It is straight-forward to see that VIFI(β∗
sp,P∗
sp) = 0 (where VIFI is deﬁned by (5)) implies
that VIFI(˜ β, ˜ P) 6= 0 ∀ ˜ β ∈ [0,1] and for ˜ P < P∗
sp.
Since Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 show that with (β∗
sp, P∗
sp) zero proﬁt is attained, it must
be the case that with ˜ β ∈ [0,1] 6= β∗
sp and P∗
sp, the IFI earns negative proﬁts. It follows that if
˜ P < P∗
sp, with ˜ β, the IFI must earn negative proﬁts. Since the IFI must earn zero proﬁts, ˜ P ≥ P∗
sp.
This lemma is valid for the pooling equilibrium case by redeﬁning β∗ and P∗ from Proposition
1 and Lemma 1.
14We are now ready to state the second main result of the paper. The following proposition shows
that the IFI chooses a β∗ that is too small as compared to the ﬁrst best choice βfb. From this and
Lemma 5, it follows that the insurer moral hazard problem causes the level of counterparty risk in
equilibrium to be strictly higher than that of the ﬁrst best case whenever β∗ ∈ [0,1).
Proposition 3 There exists a moral hazard problem when β∗ ∈ [0,1) in which the IFI chooses to
invest strictly too little in the liquid asset. This insurer moral hazard causes the counterparty risk
to be too high in equilibrium.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition behind this result comes from two sources. First, since the ﬁrst best case cor-
responds to optimizing the banks payoﬀ while keeping the IFI at zero proﬁt, the bank strictly
prefers to have the IFI invest more in the liquid asset. Second, the IFI must be compensated for
this individually sub-optimal choice of β by an increase in the premium. Since both β and P rise,
counterparty risk falls (i.e.
R C(γ−βPγ)
Rf f(θ)dθ falls). In other words, the moral hazard problem
on the part of the IFI creates an ineﬃciency in the choice of the investment of capital. The key
restriction on the contracting space that yields this result is that the insurance premium is paid
upfront. Because of this, the bank cannot condition its payment on an observed outcome. In the
competitive equilibrium case, the bank knows that the IFI will invest too little into the liquid asset,
and therefore lowers its payment accordingly (as from Lemma 3, any additional payment beyond
what would yield zero proﬁt to the IFI would be put into the illiquid asset and have no eﬀect on
counterparty risk).
We now develop some extensions of the model.
4 Extensions
4.1 Multiple IFIs
Let us assume now that the bank is no longer restricted to insuring with only one IFI. We
assume that the bank insures with a ﬁnite (and exogenous) number, N, IFIs in the market. For
tractability, we assume that the N IFIs all have a portfolio that takes an IID draw from the
distribution F with corresponding density f. Therefore, this gives the bank a chance to reduce how
much each counterparty holds (as compared to the case in which there was only one counterparty).
To contrast with the case in which N = 1, we assume that the penalty incurred (Z) is now linearly
proportional to the number of IFIs that fail (e.g. if 1 out of 2 IFIs fail, the bank faces a cost of
Z
2 ). The following lemma shows that in the environment described, it is equivalent to view the
bank interacting with only one (modiﬁed) representative IFI. More speciﬁcally, if we imagine the
bank insuring with all N of the IFIs, the expected proﬁt is derived given that there can be up to
N failures. The result says that there is an equivalent problem in which there is one representative
IFI, however, that IFI solves its investment problem as though it was only insuring
γ
N of the loan.
15The result comes from two key features of the setup: ﬁrst, we are analyzing an extreme case in
which each IFI takes a IID draw from the same distribution. Second, the bank has a linear payoﬀ
function.
Lemma 6 Aggregation - Denote p as the probability that 1 of the N counterparties fail. Also,
denote Πbk(i,k) as the (expected) proﬁt of the bank when i counterparties fail and k counterparties





pn(1 − p)N−nΠbk(n,N − n) = pΠbk(1,0) + (1 − p)Πbk(0,1). (12)
Proof. See appendix.
The proof proceeds by rearranging the expected proﬁt of the bank to apply the binomial theorem
to show that it collapses down to that as if only one IFI was providing the insurance. However,
each IFI is now responsible for
γ
N; a reduction in their liability.
Casual intuition should tell us that when the number of IFIs increases, the counterparty risk
should decrease. In Lemma 7, we show that when the optimal choice of each IFI is a corner solution,
this intuition holds true. However, when an interior solution is achieved, we get the startling result
that counterparty risk remains unchanged. The reason for this counterintuitive result is that when
N > 1, each IFI behaves diﬀerently than when N = 1. For what is to follow, we denote the optimal
β when N = 1 (N > 1) as β∗
1 (β∗
N). Similarly, we denote the optimal price per unit of protection
that the bank must pay to each IFI when N > 1 as P∗
N. The following proposition shows that the
smaller the size of the contract that an IFI engages in, the riskier they will behave, and consequently
counterparty risk will remain unchanged (provided an interior solution for β∗
N is attained). What
is happening is that the IFI has less obligation so that the state of the world in which a claim is
made will see them liquidating less of their portfolio. Therefore, the IFI will have an incentive to
put more into the illiquid asset to take advantage of its higher return.
Proposition 4 Given an interior solution for β∗
N:
1. The optimal proportion of the illiquid asset bought is decreasing in the amount of insurance
contracts per IFI.
2. Counterparty risk that the bank is subjected to remains unchanged.
Proof. See appendix.
This proposition shows that as the amount of the insurance contract that each IFI takes on
decreases, the IFI reduces the percentage of the premium they put in the liquid asset. This re-
duction is by the exact amount so that the counterparty risk remains unchanged. This yields the
counterintuitive result that even though each IFI is insuring less of the loan, the counterparty risk
that the bank must endure does not decrease.
16We now look at the consequences of a corner solution in the IFI’s problem. If the IFI is being
as risky as it can be (β∗
N = 0), counterparty risk decreases from the case in which N = 1 whenever
the boundary constraint is strictly binding.19 What is happening is that as N becomes large, the
savings in the counterparty risk comes entirely from the reduction in liability of each IFI.
The ﬁnal case in which counterparty risk decreases when N > 1 compared to when N = 1
is when β∗
N = 1. What is happening is that the IFI is so cautious that even after their liability
decreases, they still invest as safe as possible. One case this may apply is when the insurance
contract is being written on a “very” risky loan (b close to one). The following lemma formalizes
these two cases.
Lemma 7 If β∗
N = 0 or β∗
N = 1, counterparty risk decreases when N > 1 from the case where
N = 1.
Proof. Plug β∗
N = 0 and β∗
N = 1 into the counterparty risk term C(γ −γPβ) and notice that this
is an increasing function of γ. This in turns implies that counterparty risk decreases with respect
to a decrease in γ.
We now relax the assumption that there is only one bank by allowing many banks to simulta-
neously purchase insurance contracts with a single IFI.
4.2 Multiple Banks
In this section, we analyze the case of multiple banks and one insurer. We assume there are
a measure M < 1 of banks. This assumption is meant to approximate the case where there are
many banks, and the size of each individual bank’s insurance contract is insigniﬁcant for the IFI’s
investment decision.20 Using an uncountably large number instead of a countably ﬁnite but large
number of banks helps simplify the analysis greatly. Each bank requests an insurance contract of
size γ. At time t = 0, each bank receives both an aggregate and idiosyncratic shock which assigns
them a probability of default of their loan. For simplicity, this loan is assumed to have a rate
of return of RB if it succeeds and 0 if it does not. The idiosyncratic shock assigns the banks a
probability of default which we deﬁne as ξ and let it be uniformly distributed. The CDF can then





0 if ξ ≤ 0
ξ
M if ξ ∈ (0,M)
1 if ξ ≥ M
19This implies there is one technical case in which the counterparty risk would remain constant. It arises when
the β
∗
N = 0 but with the lower bound constraint not binding.
20This is the setup we would expect in a traditional insurance market such as health or automobile. However, we
will continue to use the example of credit risk transfer in banking.
17Next, denote the aggregate shock as pA and let it take the following form:
pA =
(
r with probability 1
2
s with probability 1
2,
where 0 < s < r < 1 − M. It follows that the probability of default of a bank is p = pA + ξ.
The example we use is that the aggregate shock puts the banks in one of two industries, a (s)afe
or a (r)isky one. Furthermore, the idiosyncratic shock assigns a level of risk to each bank within
an industry. It follows that the conditional distribution determining the measure of banks that
default in the safe industry, p(ξ|pA = s) ﬁrst order stochastically dominates that of the risky
industry p(ξ|pA = r), since p(ξ|pA = s) ≥ p(ξ|pA = r) ∀ ξ. Note that this is in contrast to the
usual deﬁnition of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance which entails higher draws providing a ‘better’
outcome. In the case of this model, the opposite is true, since lower draws refer to a lower probability
of default; a ‘better’ outcome.
4.2.1 The IFI’s Problem
Because of the asymmetric information problem, the IFI does not know ex-ante whether the
loans are in the safe or risky industry (i.e. whether the aggregate shock was pA = s or pA = r). It
seems reasonable to imagine that banks have superior knowledge about the state of the industry in
which they are extending loans. The IFI, even though they do not know the quality of the industry,
is assumed to know what banks belong to the same industry. That is, they know that all banks
belong to the same industry, but they do not know the quality of that industry. Therefore, if only
a subset of the banks can successfully reveal their types, this reveals it for the rest of them.
The IFI is assumed contractually obligated to pay γ to each bank who’s loan defaults, conditional
on them being solvent. In Lemma 9 we will show that there can be no separation of types within
the idiosyncratic shock. Because of this, it follows that given a ﬁxed realization of the aggregate
shock, each bank pays the same premium P.21 We assume that the IFI has the same choice as in
section 2.3, so that it invests a proportion β of the premium in the liquid storage asset and (1−β)
in the illiquid asset with return RI. We let the IFI’s beliefs distribution over the measure of banks
that will default be given by b(ξ) deﬁned over the interval [0,M]. Since each bank insures γ, the
total size of contracts insured by the IFI is:
R M
0 γdΦ(ξ) = Mγ. The IFI’s payoﬀ can now be written
21We are not concerned with pinning down the price in this section. However, we are interested in whether the
IFI oﬀers a single aggregate pooling price, or two separating prices. We can imagine the IFI having market power in
this section, however, it is not crucial.
































The ﬁrst term represents the case when the IFI has put suﬃcient capital into the liquid asset so
that there is no need to liquidate its portfolio to pay claims. This happens if a suﬃciently small
measure of banks make claims. Since the IFI receives PMγ in insurance premia, it puts βPMγ
into the liquid asset. It follows that if less than βPMγ is needed to pay claims (i.e. less than βPM
banks failed), portfolio liquidation is not necessary. The second term represents the case in which
the IFI must liquidate its portfolio if a claim is made. This happens if the amount they need to
pay in claims is greater than βPMγ. C (ξγ − βPMγ) − βPMγ represents the total cost of their
claims payment, where ξMγ − βPγ is the total amount of capital the IFI needs to liquidate from
its portfolio. The ﬁnal term represents the direct proceeds from the insurance premium. We need
to make the usual assumption that G ≥ C (ξγ − βPMγ) − βPMγ so that the IFI wishes to fulﬁl
the contract when they are solvent.
The following lemma both derives the optimal β∗ and proves that counterparty risk is less when
a set of beliefs ﬁrst order stochastically dominates another.
Lemma 8 For a given aggregate shock, there is less counterparty risk when the IFI’s beliefs put
more weight on the industry as being risky (pA = r) as opposed to it being safe (pA = s).
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition for this result is similar to that of Lemma 4. If the IFI believes that the pool
of loans is risky, it is optimal for them to invest more in the liquid asset. This happens because
the expected number of claims is higher in the risky case so that the IFI wishes to prevent costly
liquidation by investing more in assets that will be easily available if a claim is made.
We now give the conditions under which the IFI’s beliefs (b(ξ)) are formed.
4.2.2 Equilibrium Beliefs
No Aggregate Shock
To analyze how the beliefs of the IFI are formed, we ﬁrst consider the case where there is no
aggregate shock. Since there is no uncertainty in what industry the IFI is insuring, its optimal
19investment choice remains the same regardless of whether it oﬀers a pooling price or individual
separating prices.22 It follows that since an individual’s choice will have no eﬀect on counterparty
risk, only the premium eﬀect is active. It is for this reason that a separating equilibrium cannot
exist. To see this, assume that each bank reveals its type truthfully. Now consider the bank with
the highest probability of default, call it bank M. Since it is paying the highest insurance premium,
it can lie about its type without any eﬀect on counterparty risk, and obtain a better premium, and
consequently, a better payoﬀ. The following lemma formalizes.
Lemma 9 There can be no separating equilibrium in which the idiosyncratic shock is revealed.
We now introduce the aggregate shock and show that separation of industries can occur.
Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Shock
Each individual bank now receives both an aggregate and an idiosyncratic shock. We can think
of this procedure as putting the banks in one of two intervals (either [s,s + M] or [r,r + M]).
We know that if one bank is able to successfully reveal its industry (aggregate shock), then the
industry is revealed for all other banks. The following proposition shows that a unique separating
equilibrium can exist in this setting.
Proposition 5 There exists a parameter range in which a unique separating equilibrium in the
aggregate shock can be supported.
Proof. See appendix.
This insight follows from the structure of the industry. If a single bank could reveal only its
own industry, and not the industry of the other banks at the same time, their premium would
be insigniﬁcant to the IFI’s investment decision. However, since by successfully revealing itself a
bank also reveals every other bank’s type, their individual problem has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on IFI’s
investment choice. The parameter range that can support this equilibrium is similar to the case in
which there was only one bank. Some conditions that can support this equilibrium as unique are:
Z suﬃciently high, and the safe aggregate shock suﬃciently low.
In a typical problem with a continuum of agents, no single agent can aﬀect the equilibrium
outcome through his or her choices. However, with informational problems like the one we have
analyzed here, an individual who has a measure zero can aﬀect the equilibrium outcome.
We now revert to the case of one bank and turn our attention to the bank-borrower relationship
and show the consequences that the traditional moral hazard problem has in the model.
22To see this, note that with no aggregate risk, the IFI knows the average quality of banks and will use that to
make its investment decision based. Any bank claiming that they received the lowest idiosyncratic shock will not
change the IFIs beliefs about the average quality.
204.3 Moral Hazard in the Bank-Borrower Relationship
We now relax the assumption that monitoring of the borrower is costless for the bank thereby
introducing the traditional moral hazard problem into our framework. For simplicity, we do away
with the adverse selection problem, or alternatively, assume that the needed parameterization
underlying Proposition 2 is satisﬁed.23 Deﬁne M as the amount monitored that takes a value in
the compact interval [0,M]. We introduce a cost of monitoring function for a loan: c(M) with
c0() > 0, c00() > 0 and c(0) = 0. For simplicity, we rule out corner solutions by assuming c(·)
satisﬁes the Inada conditions: c0(0) = 0 and c0(M) = +∞. As well, we redeﬁne the return cdf
(pdf) of the loan to be H(ψ;M) (h(ψ;M)) that satisﬁes the usual Monotone Likelihood Ratio






> 0. Finally, we make the standard assumption that the
distribution satisﬁes the convexity-of-distribution function (CDFC) assumption (as in Hart and
Holmstrom, 1987).24 This assumption implies that for any λ ∈ [0,1], and for any M,M0:
h(ψ;λM + (1 − λ)M0) ≤ λh(ψ;M) + (1 − λ)h(ψ;M0) (14)
MLRP and CDIC assumptions together intuitively say that increasing the monitoring, increases,
at a decreasing rate, the probability that the return will be above some level ψ.25 We begin by
analyzing the case in which the bank cannot insure itself to avoid the penalty (Z) if the loan fails.
4.3.1 No Insurance
When the bank does not use insurance, the optimal amount of monitoring is the incentive
feasible level as follows:
Z S,R
1
















(Z − ψ)dH(ψ;M0) − c(M0) ∀ M0 6= M. (15)
Where we use (S,R) as an the upper bound of the return distribution because it could be either
loan type we are analyzing. Hart and Holmstrom (1987) showed that given MLRP and CDIC,
23All the analysis of this section carries through if we allow for adverse selection; there will be expressions for each
loan type in both the pooling and separating equilibria yielding the same qualitative results.
24This assumption is used in the ﬁrst order approach to principal agent problems when the monitoring space is
continuous. It allows us to write the inﬁnite number of incentive constraints in one equation. We do not wish to weigh
in on the debate that began in the late 1970’s as to the validity of the ﬁrst order approach. For those who ﬁnd the
CDIC assumption unpalatable, Jewitt (1988) Theorem 1 shows how it can be relaxed with additional assumptions
on the utility function. The alternative approach to the continuous case is to discretize the monitoring space so that
there is a ﬁnite number of incentive constraints. The qualitative results of this section follow through with such a
procedure, provided there are greater than 2 levels of monitoring (for reasons which will soon become apparent). We
use the continuous setup for convenience, as it maps back easily to our previous results.
25See Laﬀont and Martimort (2002) for a nice review of the ﬁrst order approach to principal agent problems.








Where HM is the partial with respect to M. Note that we have used the fact that the MLRP
assumption implies the weaker condition of First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD) which im-
plies that
R S,R
0 ψdHM(ψ;M) > 0. The left hand side represents the marginal cost of increasing
monitoring and is given by the marginal increase in the cost of monitoring itself. The right hand
side represents its marginal beneﬁt and is comprised of both the increase in the expected value of
the loan, and the reduced probability of being subjected to the cost of Z that monitoring brings.
We now look at the case in which the bank can perfectly insure (i.e. no counterparty risk)
themselves to avoid the possible cost of Z.
4.3.2 Insurance, No Counterparty Risk










(1 + ψ)dHM(ψ;M) + γP NCR
M − c0(M) = 0. (17)
Where PNCR
M represents the marginal price with no counterparty risk. Note that FOSD im-
plies
R 1
0 dHM(ψ;M) < 0, and Lemma 2 implies ∂P







∂b < 0 . Finally, since FOSD implies both
R 1
0 dHM(ψ;M) < 0 and
R S,R
1 dHM(ψ;M) >













Marginal Beneﬁt of Monitoring
(18)
Again, the left hand side represents the marginal cost of monitoring. For an increase in mon-
itoring, the bank incurs the monitoring cost itself, plus a decrease in expected payout from the
claim (because claims are made less with more monitoring). The beneﬁts to monitoring are the
increase in the expected return of the loan, plus the reduced insurance premium the bank will enjoy
by reducing the probability that a claim will be made.










In other words, when default of the loan without protection is suﬃciently costly, the ﬁrm will choose
to monitor more when it is not insured. Note that the sign of PM −
R 1
0 dHM(ψ;M) is ambiguous
22and depends on the underlying parameters of the model. When PM ≤
R 1
0 dHM(ψ;M), the bank
will always monitor more when they are not insured (for any Z > 0).
We continue by adding counterparty risk to the insurance contract and show that the moral
hazard problem may be less severe than in the current case.
4.3.3 Insurance with Counterparty Risk - Double Moral Hazard
When the bank uses insurance and is subject to counterparty risk, a double moral hazard
problem is present: Both the hidden actions of monitoring by the bank, and investing by the IFI
occur simultaneously in our model. Therefore, we must respect the incentive constraints of both
















dF(θ) − c0(M) − γPCR
M = 0 (20)
Where PCR
M is the marginal price with counterparty risk. Because PCR
M < 0,
R 1
0 dHM(ψ;M) < 0
and
R S,R






















Marginal Beneﬁt of Monitoring
(21)
Altering Proposition 1 to include an optimal choice of monitoring by the bank, we obtain β∗ for a
given M∗.

    
    
β∗ = 0 if b(M∗) ≤ b∗
−(1 − b(M∗))(RI − 1)G + b(M∗)[C0(γ − β∗Pγ)(G − C(γ − β∗Pγ) − β∗Pγ)
+
¡
Rf − C(γ − β∗Pγ)
¢
(C0(γ − β∗Pγ) − 1)] = (RI − 1)(Rf − Rf) if b(M∗) ∈ (b∗,b∗∗)
























We can conclude that if Z is suﬃciently high, the traditional moral hazard problem will be less
severe. The parameter Z works to tie the bank to the loan. If the loan defaults, and so to does the
bank’s counterparty, the bank is not protected and is subject to the cost Z. Therefore, the higher
is Z, the more intensely the bank will monitor the loan.
One of the key elements that emerges from this section is that when we introduce the classical
moral hazard into the model, we need only modify the distribution function to include an optimal
monitoring amount. In other words, the IFI readjusts its belief of the probability of a claim given
the amount of monitoring that the bank will engage in.
5 Conclusion
In a setting in which insurers can fail, we construct a model to show a new moral hazard problem
that can arise in insurance contracts. We model a situation in which the insurer itself may default
in some states of the world. Taking account of this, when the insurer sells an insurance contract, it
uses its evaluation of the risk in the contract to optimally invest its capital. If it suspects that the
contract is safe, it puts capital into less liquid assets, which minimizes the probability they fail in
the state when a claim is not made. However, the downside of this is that when a claim is made,
they are more likely to be illiquid or insolvent and not able to fulﬁl the contract. We show that the
insurers investment choice is too risky when compared to the ﬁrst best. The existence of this moral
hazard is shown to allow a unique separating equilibrium to exist wherein the insuree freely and
credibly relays its superior information. In other words, the new moral hazard problem can alleviate
the adverse selection problem. We extend the model by increasing the number of insurers that an
insuree contracts with. We show that in this situation the counterparty risk may not decrease as
one would expect. Next we allow for multiple insurees to investigate the case where each insurance
contract is insigniﬁcant to the insurers investment choice. We show that our moral hazard problem
still exists, and we can obtain the separating equilibrium result when there is private aggregate risk.
In a ﬁnal extension, we show how the classical moral hazard problem on the part of the insuree
can have a positive eﬀect on counterparty risk.
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Proof Proposition 1. Using the assumption that f(θ) is distributed uniform over the interval










C0(γ − βPγ)(G − C(γ − βPγ) − βPγ) +
¡
Rf − C(γ − βPγ)
¢¡





[−RIγP + γP] + Pγ(1 − RI) (23)
Where G−C(γ−βPγ)−βPγ ≥ 0 by assumption, and C0(γ−βPγ)−1 ≥ 0 since C(x) ≥ x ∀ x ≥ 0.
To ensure a maximum, we take the second order condition and show the inequality that must hold.
C00(γ − βPγ)(G − C(γ − βPγ) − βPγ) +
¡
Rf − C(γ − βPγ)
¢
C00(γ − βPγ)
≥ 2C0(γ − βPγ)
¡
C0(γ − βPγ) − 1
¢
(24)
Plugging in the boundary conditions for β into the FOC, we now derive the optimal proportion of
capital put in the liquid asset as an implicit function.

    
    
β∗ = 0 if b ≤ b∗
−(1 − b)(RI − 1)G + b[C0(γ − β∗Pγ)(G − C(γ − β∗Pγ) − β∗Pγ)
+
¡
Rf − C(γ − β∗Pγ)
¢
(C0(γ − β∗Pγ) − 1)] = (RI − 1)(Rf − Rf) if b ∈ (b∗,b∗∗)







We now show that the optimal proportion of capital put in the liquid asset is increasing in b by
ﬁnding
∂β
∂b from the FOC.
250 = A + b[(−C0(γ − βPγ)(−
∂β
∂b
Pγ)(C0(γ − βPγ) − 1)














Pγ))] + G(RI − 1)Pγ (25)
Where we deﬁne:
A = C0(γ − βPγ)Pγ (G − C(γ − βPγ) − βPγ) +
¡













−C0(γ − βPγ)(G − C(γ − βPγ) − βPγ) −
¡
Rf − C(γ − βPγ)
¢
(C0(γ − βPγ) − 1) − G(RI − 1)
−C00(γ − βPγ)(G − C(γ − βPγ) − βPγ) −
¡




Rf − C(γ − βPγ)
¢
) + 2C0(γ − βPγ)(C0(γ − βPγ) − 1)
≥ 0 (27)
Where the numerator is trivially negative while the denominator is negative because of condition
(24) imposed by the SOC to achieve a maximum.
Proof of Lemma 1.
Step 1: Existence
We prove that there exists a P∗ that satisﬁes the following:















+ P∗γ(β + (1 − β)RI). (28)
Consider P∗ ≤ 0. In this case, the IFI earns negative proﬁts. To see this, notice all terms on
the right hand side of (28) are weakly negative, with the second and third terms strict (since
C(γ − βP∗γ) > βP∗γ when P∗ ≤ 0). Therefore, it must be that VIFI(β∗,P∗ ≤ 0) < 0. This
contradicts the fact that VIFI(β∗,P∗) = 0 in equilibrium.
Next, consider P∗ ≥ 1, and β = 1 (not necessarily the optimal value). In this case, the ﬁrst term
on the right hand side of (28) is strictly positive, the second and third terms are zero, while the
fourth is strictly positive. Since β∗ can yield no less proﬁt than β = 1 by deﬁnition of it being an
optimum, it must be that VIFI(β∗,P∗ ≥ 0) > 0. This contradicts the fact that VIFI(β∗,P∗) = 0
in equilibrium. Therefore, if it exists, P∗ ∈ (0,1).
To show that P∗ exists in the interval (0,1), we diﬀerentiate the right hand side of (28) to show





C0(γ − βPγ)(G − C(γ − βPγ) − βPγ) +
¡




C0(γ − βPγ) − 1
¢¤
+(1 − b)[Gγ (β + (1 − β)RI)] + γ (β + (1 − β)RI) (29)
≥ 0 (30)
Where the inequality follows from the assumption that G ≥ C(γ−βPγ)−βPγ and the assumption
that C(x) ≥ x ∀x ≥ 0 (which implies C0(x) ≥ 1). Therefore, since proﬁt is negative when P∗ ≤ 0
and positive when P∗ ≥ 1, and since proﬁt is a (monotonically) increasing function of P∗, proﬁt
must equate to zero within P∗ ∈ (0,1).
Step 2: Uniqueness
Assume the following holds: VIFI(β∗,P∗
1) = 0. Since we have already shown that proﬁt is a




1) this implies VIFI(β∗,P∗
2) > 0
(VIFI(β∗,P∗
2) < 0). Therefore, since given P∗
2 and P∗
1 and VIFI(β∗,P∗
1) = 0 implies that P∗
1 = P∗
2
must hold, our price is unique.
Proof of Lemma 2.
From the envelop theorem, we can ignore the eﬀect that changes in b have on β when we evaluate








Rf − C(γ − β∗Pγ)
¢
(C(γ − β∗Pγ) + β∗Pγ) + C(γ − β∗Pγ)G + PγG(β∗ + (1 − β∗)RI)
Rf − Rf
< 0 (31)
The inequality follows because C(·) > 0 by assumption. Since the envelop theorem is a local
condition and does not hold for large changes in b, it serves as an upper bound on the decrease in
proﬁts. It follows that an increase in b must be met with an increase in P otherwise the IFI would
make negative proﬁt and would not participate in the market.
Proof of Lemma 3. Since counterparty risk is deﬁned as
R C(γ−βPγ)
Rf f(θ)dθ, we ﬁnd the eﬀect
that a change in P has on C(γ − β∗Pγ). Since C(·) is monotonic, we focus on (γ − β∗Pγ). It
should be immediately apparent that when β∗ = 0, changes in P have no eﬀect. Intuitively, if the
IFI is already putting everything into the illiquid asset, any additional capital will be put into the
illiquid asset.
We now take the following partial derivative and show that it equates to zero.


























[C0(γ − β∗Pγ) − 1]
+
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A = C00(γ − βPγ)(G − C(γ − βPγ) − βPγ) +
¡





C0(γ − βPγ) − 1
¢
. (35)
Note that A < 0 from the assumption on the SOC (24) to ensure a maximum. Substituting (34)
into (32) yields the desired result:
∂ (γ − β∗Pγ)
∂P
= 0. (36)
Therefore changes in P have no eﬀect on counterparty risk when β attains an interior solution.
The ﬁnal situation is where β∗ = 1. We obtain:
∂(γ − γP)
∂P
= −γ < 0. (37)
In this case, the IFI puts all additional premia in the liquid asset and thus reduces the counterparty
risk.
Proof of Lemma 4. Since counterparty risk is deﬁned as
R C(γ−βPγ)
Rf f(θ)dθ, we are interested in
what happens to C(γ − β∗P∗γ) as b changes.























From Proposition 1 we know
∂β∗
∂b ≥ 0. As well, from Lemma 2 we know ∂P∗
∂b > 0. Since β∗ ∈ (0,1)
and P∗ > 0 (from Lemma 1), it follows that:
∂ (γ − β∗P∗γ)
∂b
< 0 (39)
Therefore, as b increases, counterparty risk decreases when β ∈ (0,1). Next, consider the case of
β∗ = 1. Again, from Lemma 2 we know ∂P∗
∂b > 0. Therefore,
∂(γ−β∗P∗γ)
∂b < 0 regardless of whether
∂β∗
∂b = 0 or
∂β∗
∂b > 0. Thus, counterparty risk decreases when b decreases if β∗ = 1.
It is obvious that if β∗ = 0 there will be no change in counterparty risk by noting that β∗Pγ will
be independent of b.
Proof of Proposition 2. We begin by ruling out a separating equilibrium when there is no
counterparty risk. Without counterparty risk:
R 0
Rf dF(θ) = 0. It follows that the left hand side of
(8) and (9) are both zero. Since PR − PS > 0, (8) and (9) cannot be simultaneously satisﬁed so
that the separating equilibrium cannot exist.
We now introduce counterparty risk and show that the separating equilibrium in which the safe
(risky) type reports they are risky (safe) cannot exist. The condition under which the safe type
would prefer to be revealed as risky can be written as follows:









expected saving in counterparty risk
≥ PR − PS | {z }
amount extra to be paid in insurance premia
(40)
Next, we write the condition under which the risky type would prefer to be revealed as safe as:









expected cost of the additional counterparty risk
≤ PR − PS | {z }






0 dHR(ψ), it follows that the left hand side of (40) is unambiguously smaller
29than the left hand side of (41). It follows that (40) and (41) cannot simultaneously hold, and thus
this separating equilibrium cannot exist.
We proceed by showing the conditions for which the two pooling equilibria can exist. We begin
with the case in which both types wish to be revealed as safe. We deﬁne β1/2 and P1/2 as the
equilibrium result from the IFI’s problem when the belief of the probability of a claim cannot be






0 dHR(ψ). Finally, we let βOE and POE be the result from
the IFI’s problem when a bank gives an oﬀ the equilibrium path report of R. The following two
conditions formalize this case:









expected cost of the additional counterparty risk
≤ POE − P1/2 | {z }
amount to be saved in insurance premia
(42)









expected cost of the additional counterparty risk
≤ POE − P1/2 | {z }
amount to be saved in insurance premia
(43)
The binding condition (43) is satisﬁed for Z suﬃciently small. The intuition is that if counterparty
risk is not too costly, the bank would wish to obtain lowest insurance premium. In other words, the







We continue by analyzing the case in which both types report that they are risky. In this case,
we will use the notation βOE2 and POE2 to indicate the oﬀ the equilibrium path beliefs if a bank
reports that they are safe. The conditions can be characterized as follows:









expected saving in counterparty risk
≥ P1/2 − POE2
| {z }
amount extra to be paid in insurance premia
(44)









expected saving in counterparty risk
≥ P1/2 − POE2
| {z }
amount extra to be paid in insurance premia
(45)
The binding condition (44) is satisﬁed for Z suﬃciently high. Intuitively, the bank is so averse to
counterparty risk, that the counterparty risk eﬀect dominates. It follows that for this equilibrium
30to exist, b < 1
2
R 1




We now show that the separating equilibrium deﬁned by (8) and (9) can be unique. Combining













Turning to the pooling equilibria, we use extreme oﬀ the equilibrium path beliefs for simplicity (the
following is valid for the general belief as well). Let OE = R and OE2 = S. The condition under













It follows that if (46) and (47) are satisﬁed, the separating equilibrium exists and is unique. To
see that these conditions can be simultaneously satisﬁed, let lim
R 1
0 dHS(ψ) → 0 so that the right
hand side of both (46) and (47) are satisﬁed. It follows that if Z is suﬃciently large, the left hand
side of these two inequalities can be satisﬁed yielding a unique separating equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3. The Proof proceeds in 3 steps. Step 1 derives the ﬁrst order condition
for the ﬁrst best problem. Step 2 assumes the equilibrium solution and derives an expression for
∂P
∂β from the IFI’s zero proﬁt condition. Step 3 shows that βfb and Pfb must be greater than in
the equilibrium case when β∗ < 1. Since the results apply for either the separating or pooling
equilibrium, we show that β∗ < βfb, where these can be either equilibrium case.
Step 1



















(Z − ψ)dF(θ)dH(ψ) − γP (48)
For the ﬁrst best case, Pfb is now endogenous and determined by VIFI(βfb,Pfb) = 0 (where VIFI
is deﬁned by (5)). Using the uniform assumption on F yields the following ﬁrst order condition.
∂P
∂β











The left hand side represents the marginal cost of increasing β, while the right hand side represents
the marginal beneﬁt of doing so.
31Step 2
We show that if βfb = β∗, then (49) cannot hold. We know that from the IFI’s problem, the





C0(γ − β∗P∗γ)(G − C(γ − β∗P∗γ) − β∗P∗γ) +
¡
Rf − C(γ − β∗P∗γ)
¢





[−RIγP ∗ + γP ∗] + P∗γ(1 − RI) (50)
We now ﬁnd an expression for ∂P
∂β
¯ ¯ ¯
β=β∗,P=P∗ by implicitly diﬀerentiating the equation VIFI(β∗,P∗) =
0.















+ Pγ(β + (1 − β)RI) (51)
Implicitly diﬀerentiating this equation to ﬁnd ∂P







= (1 − b)
G
Rf − Rf




[C0(γ − β∗P∗γ)(G − C(γ − β∗P∗γ) − β∗P∗γ)
+
¡
Rf − C(γ − β∗P∗γ)
¢¡




A = bβ∗γ[C0(γ − β∗P∗γ)(C(γ − β∗P∗γ) + β∗P∗γ) −
¡
Rf − C(γ − β∗P∗γ)
¢¡
C0(γ − β∗P∗γ) − 1
¢
+C0(γ − β∗P∗γ)G]. (53)
It follows that ∂P
∂β
¯ ¯ ¯
β=β∗,P=P∗ = 0 since the right hand side of (52) is the FOC derived in Proposition






β=β∗,P=P∗ = 0 into (49) yields:




which cannot hold since γ > 0,
R 1
0 dH(ψ) > 0 and Z > 0. Therefore, βfb 6= β∗ and Pfb 6= P∗. To
satisfy (49), it must be the case that βfb > β∗. From Lemma 5 we know that Pfb ≥ P∗. However,





32counterparty risk is strictly smaller in the ﬁrst best case as compared to the equilibrium case.
It is obvious that if β∗ = 1, it is not possible for the ﬁrst best to be any less risky. This is the case
in which the IFI is already investing everything in the liquid asset.
Proof of Lemma 6. Deﬁne the payoﬀ for a bank (bk) who contracts with N IFIs. For simplicity,


























dH(ψ) − γNPN (55)
Where prob(n IFIs fail) represents the probability that n IFIs fail, prob(n IFIs do not fail) repre-
sents the probability that n IFIs do not fail, and γNPN represents the total premium paid by the
bank. For simplicity (and since the IFIs are ex-ante identical) we assume that they each individu-
ally receive PN in exchange for their coverage of
γ




prob(n IFIs do not fail) n
N
¢



























































aN−1(1 − a) + ... + a(1 − a)N−1
¸
(58)
Where the second equality follows by expanding the summation and reversing the order. We now






aN−2(1 − a) +
(N − 2)!
2!(N − 3)!
aN−3(1 − a)2 + ... + (1 − a)N−1
¸
(59)






aM−1(1 − a) +
(M − 1)!
2!(M − 2)!











= a[a + (1 − a)]
M (62)
Where the ﬁnal equality follows from the binomial theorem. Since N is ﬁnite, this implies M is


































































dH(ψ) − γNPN (65)
We can see that the expected payoﬀ of the bank is given by the expected payoﬀ as if the bank were
dealing with only one IFI, but the IFI was making its investment decision with a contract size of
γ
N.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof proceeds in two steps. In step one we show that as γ
decreases, the IFI decreases β∗
N (compared to the case of β∗
1). Step two shows that as a result of
the decrease of β∗
N, counterparty risk remains unchanged. This proof will follow closely the proof
of Lemma 3.
Since counterparty risk is deﬁned as
R C(γ−βPγ)
Rf f(θ)dθ, we ﬁnd the eﬀect that changes in γ have on
C(γ − β∗Pγ). Since C(·) is monotonic, we focus on γ − β∗Pγ. This proposition focuses only on
the case in which β∗ achieves an interior solution.
Step 1
In this step we take the following partial derivative and show that it equates to zero.



























[C0(γ − β∗Pγ) − 1]
+
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∂P yields the following.
∂β∗
∂P
PγA = (1 − β∗P)A (68)
Where we deﬁne:
A = C00(γ − β∗Pγ)(G − C(γ − β∗Pγ) − β∗Pγ) +
¡





C0(γ − β∗Pγ) − 1
¢
. (69)





0. This implies that as γ decreases (N increases), β∗
N decreases as desired.
Step 2
Substituting (68) into (66) yields the following.
∂ (γ − β∗Pγ)
∂P





By Lemma 6, we can view the counterparty risk as the probability that one IFI is insolvent when
a claim is made (given its investment choice is solved for with a contract size of
γ
N). Since this
probability does not change in the case when N > 1 from N = 1, it follows that counterparty risk
remains unchanged.
Proof of Lemma 8. Optimizing ΠMB
IFI choosing β yields the following ﬁrst order condition (recall






(−PMγ(1 − RI))G∂b(ξ) +
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[−C0(ξγ − β∗PMγ)(−PMγ)(−C(ξγ − β∗PMγ) − β∗PMγ)
+
¡
Rf − C(ξγ − β∗PMγ)
¢¡
−C0(ξγ − β∗PMγ)(−PMγ) − PMγ
¢













PM + (1 − RI)PMγ (71)








[C0(ξγ − β∗PMγ)(G − C(ξγ − β∗PMγ) − β∗PMγ)
+
¡
Rf − C(ξγ − β∗PMγ)
¢¡
C0(ξγ − β∗PMγ) − 1
¢
]
+Rfβ∗γ − RfG − γ(RI − 1) (72)
The SOC implies that the right hand side of (72) is decreasing in β∗ so that our problem achieves
a maximum. Deﬁne two belief distributions b1(ξ) and b2(ξ) such that b1(ξ) ≥ b2(ξ) ∀ξ. As well, let
(β∗
1,b1(ξ)) solve the ﬁrst order condition (71). Intuitively, moving from b1(ξ) to b2(ξ), mass shifts













Since it is assumed that the FOC holds with (β∗
1,b1(ξ)), given (73) and (74) that with (β∗
1,b2(ξ)), it
follows that β∗
1 must increase for (72) to hold. In other words, the riskier the distribution of loans
that the IFI insures, the more that it invests in the liquid asset.
To proceed we use a similar result to that of Lemma 2. It is straight forward to see that when the
beliefs of default are higher (as in the risky case), so must the price of the contracts be higher (this
can be shown in the same way that Lemma 2 was proved by showing that a net proﬁt function is
decreasing in the amount of risk in the loans). Next we ﬁnd what happens to counterparty risk.
What is diﬀerent about the case of multiple banks is that the counterparty risk is deﬁned relative





In the case where the IFI puts more weight on the loans being risky (pA = r), β∗ and P∗ increase,
so that C(γ −βPγ) decreases. Furthermore, since from the point of view of a bank the probability
of a claim does not change, counterparty risk decreases as compared to when the IFI puts more
weight on the loans being safe (pA = s).
36Proof of Proposition 5. The proof proceeds in 3 steps. Steps 1 and 2 determine when the
pooling equilibria cannot exist. In particular, we use beliefs of the IFI for which banks have the
greatest incentive to pool. In step 1 we assume that all banks report that they are in the safe
industry (pA = s) and ﬁnd a condition wherein at least one bank who received the aggregate shock
pA = r wishes to reveal it truthfully. In the second step we assume that all banks are reporting
that they are in the risky industry (pA = r) and ﬁnd a condition wherein at least one bank who
received the aggregate shock pA = s wishes to reveal it truthfully.26 Step 3 determines when a
unique separating equilibrium can exist. We use beliefs such that the banks have the least incentive
to separate. In this step we assume banks are separating and ﬁnd the condition wherein both bank
types do not wish to deviate and be revealed as the other.
Step 1
Consider all banks reporting that they are safe (pA = s), regardless of the aggregate shock. Now
consider the incentive of banks who have received the aggregate shock pA = r. Given that all banks
are reporting that they are safe, we need to ﬁnd one bank who wishes to send the message that they
are risky (pA = r). If every bank reports that it is in the safe industry, the IFI does not update its
beliefs. However, if at least one bank deviates and says that it in the risky industry, then all banks
are believed risky, with the deviating bank(s) believed to have received highest idiosyncratic shock
(ξ = M) (or, if there is a measure of deviating banks, the highest measure of the idiosyncratic
shock). We know that the bank with the greatest incentive to be revealed as risky is the one with
the highest idiosyncratic shock, which we denote as bank M. Denote the probability of default
of the loan of this bank as pr






individual separating price for a risky bank with the highest idiosyncratic shock be Pr
M, and let
the total price be Pr. Next, we denote the optimal investment choice of the IFI in the pooling
(separating) case by β1/2 (βr). Finally, we will let D1/2 (Dr) represent the probability that upon a














Mγ(1 − Dr) − pr
MγDrZ − γP r
M ≥ (1 − pr
M)RB + pr














Consider all banks reporting that they are risky (pA = r), regardless of the aggregate shock. Now
consider the incentive of banks who receive the aggregate shock pA = s. We ﬁnd the condition
under which a bank would like to reveal that it is safe (pA = s). Let the beliefs of the IFI be
26Note that there are other pooling equilibria in which some banks report diﬀerently than others. These can arise
when the IFI’s beliefs are such that no new information is gleaned from the reports. Since these equilibria yield the
same outcome, we will focus only on the cases described.
27Note that the total price is the per unit price that the IFI receives, while the individual price is the per unit
price that a bank pays.
37that if all banks report that they are risky, with at least one reporting that it is safe, then the
banks are safe, with the deviating banks believed to have received the lowest idiosyncratic shock
(ξ = 0) (again, if there is a measure of deviating banks, than they receive the lowest measure of
the idiosyncratic shocks). We know that the bank with the greatest incentive to be revealed as
safe is the one with the lowest idiosyncratic shock, call it bank 0. Denote the probability of default
for the loan of this bank as ps
0 and the individual price if they reveal themselves as safe as Ps
M.28
We let the total price be Ps. Finally, let βs represent the optimal investment choice of the IFI





Rf dF(θ)db(ξ). The condition under which this bank has the incentive to
reveal its type truthfully can be written as follows.
(1 − ps
0)RB + ps
0γ(1 − Ds) − ps
0γDsZ − γP s
M ≥ (1 − ps
0)RB + ps













From Lemma 9, we know that in the (aggregate) pooling case, there can be no separating equi-
















To see that (77) can hold, take the limit as ps
0 approaches zero and set Z suﬃciently high.
Step 3
We now ﬁnd the conditions under which the separating equilibrium exists. Consider the case where
each bank is revealing its aggregate shock.29 Let the beliefs of the IFI be as follows: if there is
at least one bank reporting that they are in the safe industry, with the rest reporting risky, then
everyone is believed to be in the safe industry. Because we are trying to show that a separating
equilibrium can exist, we take the simple case in which the resulting price for the deviating bank(s)
is Ps. Since there can be no separating equilibrium in the idiosyncratic shock, we let Pr
0 = Pr.
Next, if at least one bank reports that it is in the risky industry while the rest report that they are
safe, then everyone is believed risky, with the deviating bank(s) receiving the price Pr. Again, since
there can be no separation in the idiosyncratic shock, let Ps
M = ps. The two cases are analyzed
below.
28Note that the price corresponds to the highest idiosyncratic shock because we ﬁnd the condition under which a
bank is least likely to default.
29Note that there are other separating equilibria where some report their type truthfully, while others do not. For
simplicity we will not consider these here.
38(1 − pr
0)RB + pr
0γ(1 − Dr) − pr
0γDrZ − γPr ≥ (1 − pr
0)RB + pr
0γ(1 − Ds) − pr
0γDsZ − γPs
⇒ pr
0 (Ds − Dr)(1 + Z) ≥ Pr − Ps (78)
Turning to the second case, we derive the following condition.
(1 − ps
M)RB + ps
Mγ(1 − Ds) − ps
MγDsZ − γPs ≥ (1 − ps
M)RB + ps
Mγ(1 − Dr) − ps
MγDrZ − γPr
⇒ Pr − Ps ≥ ps
M (Ds − Dr)(1 + Z)(79)





M (Ds − Dr)









M, these inequalities can be satisﬁed by choosing Z appropriately. It follows that the
separating equilibrium exists and is unique when both (77) and (80) are satisﬁed. To see that this
is possible, consider ps
M and ps
0 suﬃciently small so that for Z suﬃciently large both the right hand
side of (77) and (80) are satisﬁed.
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